Kenneth Deffeyes
February 11, 2006
http://www.princeton.edu/hubbert/current-events.html
In the January 2004 Current Events on
this web site, I predicted that
world oil production would peak on
Thanksgiving Day, November 24, 2005. In
hindsight, that prediction was in error by
three weeks. An update using
the 2005 data shows that we passed the peak on
December 16, 2005.
"A decent respect to the opinions of
mankind requires" that I present an
update on the data sources and the
interpretation.
The underlying methodology is Hubbert's postulate that the rate of new oil
discoveries depends on the fraction of the oil
that has not yet been
discovered. Similarly, the rate of oil
production depends on the fraction
of oil that has not yet been produced. A test
of Hubbert's hypothesis,
using the long history of
Beyond Oil. An algebraic result from the Hubbert theory says that the
production rate peaks when half of the oil has
been produced.
The most accurate measure of the eventual
total oil comes from the "hits"
graph on page 48 of Beyond Oil. The input data
for that graph are the
dates of the first well in each oilfield. The
February 2006 edition of
Colin Campbell's ASPO newsletter contains his
updated version of the
ExxonMobil discovery dates. I enlarged
data for 2004 and 2005. An update of the
calculation reported on page 49
of Beyond Oil gives an unchanged estimate:
2.013 trillion barrels. (There
is always a statistical nervousness when an estimate
does not change. I
make the estimates by stepwise trials, and the
winning step was 2.013.
What I know is that neither estimate was 2.012
or 2.014.)
The world peak would then happen when 1.0065
trillion barrels have been
produced (half of 2.013). Following Hubbert, I used the Oil & Gas Journal
end-of-year production numbers. It isn't that
the Oil & Gas Journal
reports are divinely inspired; their
methodology is well explained and
their reports constitute a relatively consistent
data set. The cumulative
world production at the end of 2004 was 0.9812
trillion barrels and at the
end of 2005 it was 1.00748 trillion. During
the year, we passed the
halfway point. The graph shows the date of the
crossover: December 16,
2005.
During the year, we passed the halfway point.
The graph shows the date of
the crossover: December 16, 2005.
There are some interesting additional bits in
the end-of-year statistics.
Compared to 2004, world oil production was up
0.8 percent in 2005, nowhere
near enough to compensate for a demand rise of
roughly 3 percent. The high
prices did not bring much additional oil out
of the ground. Most oil-
producing countries are in decline. The rise
in production was largely
from
9.155 million barrels per day. On March 6,
2003 Saudi Aramco and the
government of
that they were maxed out at 9.2 barrels per day. In retrospect, that
statement
seems to be accurate. Further details are in
Matthew Simmons' book
Twilight in the Desert.
Could some new discovery come along and
reverse the global oil decline?
The world oil industry is a huge system:
Annual production worth 1.7
trillion dollars. I don't see anything on the
horizon large enough to turn
it around.
So what are the policy implications? Numerous
critics are claiming that
the present world economic situation is a
house of cards: built on trade
deficits, housing price bubbles, and
barely-adequate natural gas supplies.
Pulling any one card out from the bottom of
the pile might collapse the
whole structure.
There are calls for embargoing Iranian oil
because of the nuclear weapons
situation. Pulling four million barrels per
day out from under the world
energy supply might trigger a severe worldwide
recession. In the post-peak
era, we're playing a new ball game and we
don't yet know the rules.
Ghawar, the supergiant Saudi
oilfield, is producing increasing amounts of
water along with the oil. When Simmons sent
Twilight in the Desert to the
printer, the water cut at Ghawar
was around 30 percent. There are later
reports on the Internet
(home.entouch.net/dmd/ghawar.htm) of water cuts as
high as 55 percent. Ghawar
has been producing 4 million barrels per day;
when the Ghawar
field waters out, you can kiss your lifestyle goodbye.
Since we have passed the peak without
initiating major corrective
measures, we now have to rely primarily on
methods that we have already
engineered. Long-term research and development
projects, no matter how
noble their objectives, have to take a back
seat while we deal with the
short-term problems. Long-term examples in the
proposed 2007 US budget
(Feb. 9, 2006 New York Times page A-18)
include a 65 percent increase in
the programs to produce ethanol from corn, a
25.8 percent increase for
developing hydrogen fuel cell cars, and a 78.5
percent increase in
spending on solar energy research. The Times
reports that solar energy
today supplies one percent of
to 2 percent by the year 2025. By 2025, we're
going to be back in the
Stone Age.
By 2025, we're going to be back in the Stone
Age.
Ethanol, fuel cells, and solar cells are not
the only shimmering dreams.
Methane hydrates, oil shale, and the
depository would be better off forgotten.
There are plenty of solid
opportunities. Energy conservation is by far
the most important.
Initiatives that are already engineered and
ready to go are biodiesel from
palm oil, coal gasification (for both gaseous
and liquid fuels), high-
efficiency diesel automobiles, and revamping
our food supply. Every little
bit helps, but even if wind energy continues
its success it will still be
a
little bit.
That's it. I can now refer to the world oil
peak in the past tense. My
career as a prophet is over. I'm now an
historian.